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Gordon and Zhang:

Protecting the Sovereign’s Money Monopoly
Gary B. Gorton & Jeffery Y. Zhang
July 14, 2022
Abstract
Sovereign states have had a monopoly over the production of circulating currencies for well
over a century. Governments, not private entities, issue circulating currencies. Indeed, in
1986, Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz declared that “[t]he question of government
monopoly of hand-to-hand currency is likely to remain a largely dead issue.” The advent of
stablecoins—privately issued digital money that are pegged to fiat currencies like the U.S.
dollar or the Euro—raises the question of the money monopoly from the grave.
Why did sovereign money monopolies come into existence in the 19th and 20th centuries?
Should circulating private money coexist once again with sovereign money in the 21st century?
This essay explores these fundamental questions of legal and financial architecture by
revisiting the original legislative debates that led to the sovereign’s money monopoly in
England, the United States, Canada, and Sweden. In every case, privately issued monies first
circulated because of a limited money supply—a shortage of specie (i.e., metallic coins)—and
then were ultimately banned to improve financial stability, gain greater control over
monetary policy, or strengthen the sovereign’s fiscal position.
Today, lawmakers and regulators assume that coexistence between privately issued (digital)
money and sovereign (digital) money is the optimal path forward and are crafting legal
guardrails under that assumption. It is a very strong assumption—one that should be
challenged since the upside is unclear and the costs remain similar. We argue that, if
anything, the sovereign’s monopoly on circulating currencies should be protected.
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Introduction
During the 19th and 20th centuries, every country decided that the production of circulating
money would be a monopoly given to the sovereign, particularly to the country’s central bank.
Some examples are shown in Table 1 below.1 Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz thereby
concluded in 1986 that “[t]he question of government monopoly of hand-to-hand currency is
likely to remain a largely dead issue.”2 But the issue has come alive today.
Table 1: Central Banks and Money Monopolies
Country

Central Bank Founded

Decision on Monopoly

Austria

1816

1816

Norway

1816

1818

Denmark

1818

1818

United Kingdom

1694

1844

France

1800

1848

Belgium

1850

1850

Netherlands

1814

1863

Spain

1874

1874

Germany

1876

1876

Japan

1882

1883

Finland

1811

1886

Portugal

1846

1888

Sweden

1668

1897

United States

1913

1913

Italy

1893

1926

Indeed, it was considered a settled issue until the recent advent of stablecoins, a subset of
cryptocurrencies that seek to become circulating money. Stablecoins like Tether or USD Coin
are digital tokens that reside on blockchains. The issuers of most stablecoins claim that their
coins are backed by cash and safe assets, are pegged to a fiat currency like the U.S. dollar
and are redeemable on demand.
From the perspective of economic theory, stablecoin issuers are functionally equivalent to
unregulated banks.3 They suffer from run risk and can generate systemic dangers in the
1

Forrest Capie, Stanley Fischer, Charles Goodhart & Norbert Schnadt, THE FUTURE OF CENTRAL BANKING (1994).

Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, Has Government any Role in Money?, 17 JOURNAL
ECONOMICS 37, 52 (1986).
2

OF

MONETARY

See Gary B. Gorton & Jeffery Y. Zhang, Taming Wildcat Stablecoins, 90 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
(forthcoming) (arguing that privately produced monies like stablecoins are not information-insensitive and
therefore suffer from run risk when not properly regulated).
3
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financial system.4 Of note, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets agreed with
this characterization in their Report on Stablecoins.5 But the Report and the related academic
commentary do not mention the issue of the sovereign’s monopoly over money, which directly
ties into the question of whether privately produced money should coexist with the
sovereign’s money in the first place.6 Our essay addresses this question.
***
From the outset, we wish to be clear about one particular concept: circulation. There is
account-based money and token-based money. Account-based money refers to money in a
specific bank account. Person X writing a check to Person Y, for example, links the payment
to X’s bank account. That money will be deposited in Y’s bank account when the check clears
(i.e., when the money is drawn from X’s account and put into Y’s account). Account-based
money does not circulate. It does not pass hand-to-hand in a chain of transactions that are
separate from the check-clearing process, because the identity of the check writer matters.
Consequently, endorsing a check that was written to you and using the endorsed check to
buy groceries does not happen because the grocery store does not know the identity of the
check writer.7
Token-based money, on the other hand, is not history dependent. Token-based money is not
identity-linked. It is fungible like cash: A ten-dollar bill is a ten-dollar bill. It does not matter
who held the ten-dollar bill 100 transactions ago because it is not linked to an individual’s
identity. “Circulating money” therefore refers to money like cash that is not linked by identity.

See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., It’s Time to Regulate Stablecoins as Deposits and Require Their Issuers to Be
FDIC-Insured Banks, 41 BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY REPORT 1 (2022); Howell E. Jackson & Morgan
Ricks, Locating Stablecoins within the Regulatory Perimeter, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2021); Timothy G. Massad, Regulating Stablecoins Isn’t Just About Avoiding Systemic Risk,
BROOKINGS REPORT (2021); Dan Awrey, Bad Money, 106 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 1 (2020). See also Alexandros
Vardoulakis et al., Lessons from the History of the U.S. Regulatory Perimeter, FEDS NOTES (2021) (noting that
the growth of stablecoins presents a challenge to today’s bank regulatory perimeter).
4

See President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Report on Stablecoins at 2 (2021) (“To address risks to
stablecoin users and guard against stablecoin runs, legislation should require stablecoin issuers to be insured
depository institutions…”). The Report was the result of a collaborative effort by the Department of the Treasury,
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”).
5

Technically speaking, there are two important questions with respect to coexistence. One, should central banks
issue sovereign digital money, otherwise known as a CBDC? And two, should there be coexistence between
privately issued digital monies (i.e., stablecoins) and sovereign digital monies (i.e., CBDCs)? We tackle the second
question. For a high-level discussion of the first question, see Gary B. Gorton & Jeffery Y. Zhang, The Orkney
Slew and Central Bank Digital Currencies, HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL (forthcoming). Dozens of
countries are now conducting research and development involving CBDCs.
6

Some may point out that bank deposits do circulate via platforms like PayPal, Venmo, or Zelle. While these
platforms certainly allow for increased transactions, they do not deviate from the account-based model described
here. Money transferred through these services still go from one account to another. This is simply another form
of check writing, account-based money.
7

4
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/228
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4162884

4

Gordon and Zhang:

In this essay, we are concerned with circulating money. When we refer to the “coexistence”
of (private) stablecoins and (sovereign) cash, we are referring to the coexistence of two forms
of token-based money. What should be clear is that other forms of money, like checks, do not
circulate hand-to-hand. Further, as discussed in Parts II and III below, it will become clear
that account-based money and token-based money are not perfect substitutes.
***
Today, members of Congress and senior policymakers are of the view that coexistence is
possible and desirable. For example, Senator Pat Toomey is seeking to create a regulatory
framework for stablecoins that “will allow this crypto-innovation to continue flourishing
while protecting consumers and minimizing potential risks from stablecoins to the financial
system.” 8 Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell took this view during his confirmation
hearings, saying that private stablecoins could compete with sovereign digital money
(otherwise known as a central bank digital currency, or a “CBDC” for short).9 Federal Reserve
Vice Chair Lael Brainard, in a speech at the 2022 Monetary Policy Form in New York, stated
that “the coexistence of CBDC alongside stablecoins and commercial bank money could prove
complementary, by providing a safe central bank liability in the digital financial ecosystem,
much like cash currently coexists with commercial bank money.”10
As argued in more detail below, we do not believe that the coexistence of sovereign digital
currency and private digital currencies would be analogous to today’s coexistence of cash and
commercial bank money. First, commercial bank money (i.e., demand deposits) is not
designed to circulate, whereas stablecoins are designed to circulate. 11 Second, demand
deposits are insured by the FDIC, which essentially transforms them from private money
into government money. 12 These differences have wide-ranging implications for financial
stability, monetary policy, and even fiscal policy.

Press Release, Toomey Announces Legislation to Create Responsible Regulatory Framework for Stablecoins (Apr.
6,
2022),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/minority/toomey-announces-legislation-to-createresponsible-regulatory-framework-for-stablecoins.
8

See Allyson Versprille & Jesse Hamilton, Powell Says Private Coins Could Compete With Fed Digital Dollar,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-11/powell-says-private-coinscould-compete-with-fed-digital-dollar.
9

Lael Brainard, Preparing for the Financial System of the Future, Speech at the 2022 U.S. Monetary Policy
Forum (Feb. 18, 2022), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20220218a.htm. See also
Andrew Ackerman, Digital Dollar Could Coexist With Stablecoins, Fed Vice Chairwoman Says, Wall Street
Journal (May 26, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-brainard-to-tell-panel-digital-dollar-could-coexistwith-stablecoins-11653570037.
10

In short, one can think of the distinction in this way: Demand deposits are account-based. They are linked to a
specific person’s account at a specific bank. People with such accounts can write checks to people with similar
accounts. Transactions are therefore linked to specific accounts. Circulation of cash or stablecoins, on the other
hand, are based on notes or tokens. Transactions do not have to take place just between account holders.
11

See Gorton & Zhang, supra note 3, at 5. In theory, stablecoins could essentially become government money if
stablecoins were given government-backed insurance (akin to FDIC deposit insurance) or if stablecoins were
12
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The notion of coexistence is also widespread among the research community. For instance,
economists at the central bank of the Netherlands write: “In our view, public and private
money should coexist to get the best of both worlds: trust and innovation.” 13 Who can argue
with getting the best of both worlds? Well, this idea of the coexistence between private and
sovereign circulating monies has been tried in the past and was rejected—and for good
reasons. Table 2 summarizes the trade-offs between allowing for coexistence versus
maintaining the sovereign’s monopoly on circulating money.
Table 2: Coexistence v. Monopoly
Considerations

Coexistence

Monopoly

Financial Stability

Risks stability

Maintains stability

Monetary Policy

Reduces efficacy

Maintains effectiveness

Seigniorage

Dilutes gains

Maintains gains

Historically, the most compelling reason for sovereign states to possess a monopoly over
circulating currency was financial stability. Privately produced money was vulnerable to
runs; credible government money alleviated this risk. The same vulnerability exists today
with respect to privately produced stablecoins. We care about bank runs because they can
lead to full-blown financial crises, which are very costly.14 One need only remember the 2008
global financial crisis.
What about monetary policy? Paul Tucker, then deputy governor of the Bank of England,
offered the most succinct statement of the dominant approach to monetary operations: “We
are able to implement monetary policy because the economy has a demand for central bank
money and, as monopoly suppliers, we can set the terms on which we provide it.”15 This power
would be diluted if a privately produced money coexisted with the government money.
Finally, the government would lose seigniorage. The seigniorage of new money is equal to
the value of the money minus the cost required to produce it. The cost of producing the money

backed one-for-one by short-term U.S. Treasury debt or reserves at the central bank. For the purposes of this
essay, we assume that stablecoins will not become government money in those ways and so will remain “private
money.” This is not a strong assumption.
Wilko Bolt, Vera Lubbersen & Peter Wierts, Getting the Balance Right: Crypto, Stablecoin, and CBDC, DNB
Working Paper No. 736 (Jan. 2022), https://www.dnb.nl/media/jo3h1dlu/working_paper_no-_736.pdf.
13

See, e.g., Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, New Evidence on the Aftermath of Financial Crises in Advanced
Countries, 107 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 3072 (2017); Davide Furceri & Annabelle Mourougane, The Effect of
Financial Crises on Potential Output: New Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries, 34 JOURNAL OF
MACROECONOMICS 822 (2012); Mathijis A. van Dijk, The Social Costs of Financial Crises, SSRN Working Paper
(2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2278526.
14

Paul Tucker, The Central Bank’s Balance Sheet: Where Monetary Policy Meets Financial Stability, Speech to
mark the
Fifteenth
Anniversary of Lombard Street Research (2014)
(emphasis
added),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2004/managing-the-central-banks-balance-sheet.
15
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is negligible while the value of producing the money for a developed country could be up to
two percent of GDP.16 Indeed, when the central bank provides currency, it trades cash for
Treasuries and then profits from the interest paid on the Treasuries and the zero interest on
the cash. These profits are seigniorage. To the extent that the demand for government cash
is reduced, so too will their seigniorage.17
***
Our essay proceeds as follows: Part I explains what is special about money. In short, money
is special because its price is designed to remain fixed at par or nominal value, so that no one
has an incentive to produce private information about the money’s backing to take advantage
of the less informed. In other words, money is supposed to be information-insensitive.
Part II revisits historical instances of when privately produced money circulated. The key
takeaway is that privately produced money circulated when there were no better
alternatives—specifically, when there was a shortage of metallic coins issued by the
sovereign. 18 Part II also presents cases of information-sensitive money where the money
producers had unlimited liability (e.g., in Scotland during the 18th century). These monies
were information-sensitive because the identities of the backers with unlimited liability
mattered. Such systems were workable within a limited geographical area where the
identities of the backers were known. Part II then describes a case of privately issued money
with limited liability: U.S. private bank notes before the Civil War. These bank notes traded
at discounts from par when used at some distance from the issuing bank. This system was
economically inefficient.
Part III turns to historical case studies of the transition from privately issued money to the
sovereign’s monopoly over money. Specifically, Part III dives into the experiences of England,
the United States, Canada, and Sweden. Each country had its own path to a sovereign
monopoly over money production—a path that was typically long, winding, and rocky. In all
instances, privately produced monies arose because the prior regime resulted in a limited,
inelastic money supply. Alternatives were demanded and supplied by private entities. But
then why were the privately produced alternatives banished? The answer is, unsurprisingly,
based in an array of factors. The legislative debates show that each country was primarily
focused on improving financial stability by reducing the frequency of banking panics caused
by the proliferation of privately issued monies. In addition, countries were concerned about
the monetary policy implications, as the proliferation of privately issued monies made it more
See Reid W. Click, Seigniorage in a Cross-Section of Countries, 30 JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 154
(1998); Stanley Fischer, Seigniorage and the Case for a National Money, 90 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 295
(1982) (Table A1); Kenneth Rogoff & Jessica Scazzero, Covid Cash, 41 CATO JOURNAL 571 (2021) (Table 5).
16

See Charles M. Kahn, Manmohan Singh & Jihad Alwazir, Digital Money and Central Bank Operations, IMF
Working Papers (2022), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2022/05/06/Digital-Money-and-CentralBank-Operations-517534.
17

In the cryptocurrency world, there are presently no better alternatives to stablecoins. Stablecoins are the
currencies used to facilitate cryptocurrency transactions of various types.
18
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difficult to control booms and busts in the economy.19 Third, certain countries observed that
having a sovereign monopoly over money would improve their public finances.
With these lessons in mind, Part IV surveys the current landscape. In recent months, the
world has witnessed the spectacular collapse of two stablecoins. 20 The financial stability
concerns are unfolding in real time. While lawmakers and financial regulators are aware of
the risks to financial stability, their proposed solutions assume that coexistence is a given.
That is, well-regulated private money should circulate alongside sovereign money.
We challenge that assumption. If governments now decide to turn back the clock and allow
for the coexistence of privately issued circulating money and sovereign circulating money,
they would inadvertently relitigate many of the same stability, monetary, and fiscal concerns
that were widespread during the 19th and 20th centuries. The issue of coexistence should be
debated, not assumed.

In fancier terminology, the government wanted greater control over conducting countercyclical monetary
policy—to contract the money supply to prevent overheating of the economy and to expand the money supply to
prevent a recession.
19

See Hilary Allen, We’re Asking the Wrong Questions about Stablecoins, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 25, 2022),
https://www.ft.com/content/baba1a78-300a-4b3b-8481-71566ad98f59; Steve H. Hanke & Matt Sekerke, Time to
Stop Coddling Crypto, WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 25, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/time-to-stop-coddlingcrypto-cryptocurrency-stablecoin-financial-regulation-senator-toomey-money-11653494847.
20
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Part I. What’s Special About Money?
A. Theory of Money
In congressional hearings in 1894, Charles C. Homer, the President of the Second National
Bank, identified the desirable properties of money: “I believe in having a good [bank] note; a
note that will pass from hand to hand without the least question or doubt as to it bringing the
amount for which it was issued.”21 In 1890, the Supreme Court of Indiana noted the same
intuition in Hancock v. Yaden:
It is not simply the government, as a government, that is interested in the
power to establish and maintain a standard of value; for every citizen engaged
in any business of life it is of vital importance that there should be a fixed and
unchanging standard. Without it, business, except of the most meagre kind,
would be at an end, and commerce would be practically annihilated.22
Indeed, the court was asserting that it would be economically efficient to have a “fixed and
unchanging standard” of value.
These observations are essentially saying that money should circulate at par with no
questions asked (“NQA”). The price should be constant at par–a dollar is a dollar–so the lessinformed cannot be taken advantage of in transactions. In this case, the money is produced
such that no one finds it profitable to produce (private) information about the backing for
such money, and everyone knows that this is the case.
Put differently, money is supposed to be information-insensitive; money is special because its
price is not supposed to change. The price adjustments that occur because of changes in supply
and demand—like the price adjustments for bananas—do not apply to money. A one-dollar
bill is to always transact for one dollar without question. This is the NQA principle. However,
if the price does not change, then the laws of supply and demand require that the quantity
must change. These adjustments occur most dramatically during a bank run when the
outstanding quantity of the privately produced money is severely reduced.
These ideas were formalized by the economics literature.23 For instance, Dang, Gorton, and
Holmström show that the optimal way to produce information-insensitive money is by
designing the money to be debt and backed by debt—hence, debt-on-debt. Examples include

Charles C. Homer, Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, Fifty-third Congress, Third
Session (1894-1895) at 118 (emphasis added).
21

22

121 Ind. 366 (1890).

See Gary Gorton & George Pennacchi, Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation, 45 JOURNAL OF FINANCE
49 (1990); Bengt Holmström, Understanding the Role of Debt in the Financial System, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS WORKING PAPER No. 479 (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.bis.org/publ/work479.htm; Tri Vi Dang, Gary
Gorton & Bengt Holmström, The Information View of Financial Crises, 12 ANNUAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL
ECONOMICS 39 (2020).
23
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free bank notes backed by state bonds, demand deposits backed by portfolios of loans, and
sale and repurchase agreements (“repos”) backed by debt collateral. Debt-on-debt maximizes
information-insensitivity. We take this as a theory of money and use informationinsensitivity as the benchmark.
B. Economic Efficiency
In 1863, the U.S. National Bank Act was passed. This Act created national banks and
national bank notes, where those bank notes had to be backed by U.S. Treasury securities.
Prior to this Act, hundreds of privately produced bank notes (discussed further below) traded
at time-varying discounts from par, so the country had a system of multiple currencies with
floating exchange rates, that is these notes were information-sensitive.
The National Bank Act created a common currency. After the Act was passed, 729 new banks
were established between 1863 and 1866, and these new banks concentrated in what would
become the nation’s manufacturing belt. There was capital deepening in the manufacturing
sector. 24 Further, counties with access to the new national banks experienced significant
manufacturing growth.25 Multiple studies lend evidence to support the idea that having a
fixed an unchanging standard of value was beneficial for the macroeconomy. Other evidence
comes from studying optimal currency areas.26
The impact of a uniform currency on economic efficiency was well understood. With respect
to the National Bank Act of 1863, John Million wrote in 1894:
The advantages of uniformity were not hidden from the states—men of that
day who had been taught in the bitter school of experience what were the
disadvantages of a mongrel currency. The great advantage to the business of
the community of a uniform currency would lie in economy of exchange. This
point was clearly made by [U.S. Treasury] Secretary Chase in his Report of
1861, when he recommended the system for the first time, and it was reiterated
in his Report of 1862. Western people especially stood in need of a sound

See Matthew Jaremski, National Banking’s Role in U.S. Industrialization, 1850–1900, 74 JOURNAL
ECONOMIC HISTORY 109 (2014).
24

OF

See Chenzi Xu & He Yang, Monetizing the Economy: National Banks and Local Economic Development,
Stanford GSB Working Paper (Feb. 2021), https://chenzi-xu.com/docs/nationalbanks_xu_yang.pdf.
25

An “optimal currency area” is a geopolitical area where economic efficiency dictates that factors of production
be easy to move, such as labor mobility. The literature on optimal currency areas began with Robert Mundell, A
Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, 51 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 657 (1961); Ronald McKinnon, Optimum
Currency Areas, 53 American Economic Review 717 (1963); Peter Kenen, The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas:
An Eclectic View, in Mundell R. and Swoboda A. (eds.) MONETARY PROBLEMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
(1969). See also Andrew Rose, One Money, One Market: The Effect of Common Currencies on Trade, 15 ECONOMIC
POLICY 7, 9 (2000) (“I use a large cross-country panel data set to show that two countries with the same currency
trade more than comparable countries with their own currencies. Much more, perhaps over three times as much.
While lower exchange rate volatility also increases trade, the effect of a common currency appears to be an order
of magnitude larger than that of eliminating exchange rate volatility but retaining separate currencies.”).
26
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currency, both for use among themselves and in their transactions with eastern
banks.27
***
To sum up, a money with a fixed price satisfies the NQA principle and is economically
efficient.
As discussed in the next Part, privately produced monies came into existence when there
were no alternatives. Historically, this meant there was a shortage of gold and silver—that
is, there were not enough metallic coins in circulation. The privately produced monies that
were created to fill the gap were information-sensitive, meaning that parties using them in a
transaction needed to produce information. In some cases, production of that information was
not prohibitively costly because those privately produced monies were limited to a very
narrow geographical area.
Notably, as discussed below, privately produced money that does not satisfy NQA is
vulnerable to bank runs. In other words, the private sector cannot produce riskless money,
so the government steps in to insure demand deposits and produce a circulating currency.

27

John Million, The Debate on the National Bank Act of 1863, 2 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 251 (1894).
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Part II. The Circulation of Privately Issued Money
Privately produced money generally does not have a fixed and unchanging standard of value
because it does not satisfy the NQA principle.28 It is information-sensitive. There is typically
an incentive for private parties to produce more information about the money, thereby
demanding discounts from par. So, why did such money exist in the first place? Because there
were no credible alternatives.
Through the 18th century, this meant that there was no credible government money and
there was a shortage of specie. Indeed, there were around 60 instances in which a country
used privately produced bank notes as money. These banking systems were generally
referred to as “free banking” because there was, more or less, free entry into the business of
banking. These systems, however, were very heterogeneous and subject to a variety of
regulations.29
Were there cases in which privately produced money did not satisfy the NQA condition but
were still successful in circulation? Yes, such cases existed, but only in a limited geographical
area. The leading examples are (1) Scottish free bank notes and (2) English inland bills of
exchange. These forms of private money circulated in the 18th century and early 19th century.
We discuss each in turn.
A. Information-Sensitive Monies Circulating with Unlimited Liability
Scottish bank notes and English inland bills of exchange—both existing in the 18th and early
19th centuries—were examples of privately produced money where the issuers had unlimited
liability. These money forms were backed by the wealth of the partners in Scottish banks and
the signatories to the inland bills, respectively. In other words, these private monies were
information-sensitive. Identities mattered.
1. Scottish Free Banking
From 1716 to 1844, Scottish banking was characterized by free entry and unlimited note
issuance. The banks issued their own distinctive monies. Three banks had limited liability
and the rest had unlimited liability. Unlimited liability meant that the identities of the bank
partners were critical to the monies circulating as a hand-to-hand currency.30
Who were these bank partners? They appear to have been the well-known and well-to-do. For
example, the Dundee Banking Company, which began in Glasgow in 1763, had 36 partners,
28

See Gorton & Zhang, supra note 3.

29

See Kurt Schuler, THE WORLD HISTORY OF FREE BANKING: AN OVERVIEW (1992).

See Charles Munn, THE SCOTTISH PROVINCIAL BANKING COMPANIES, 1747-1864 (1981) at 5 (“[M]any bankers
pointed this [unlimited liability] out to their potential customers in the hope that public faith in their banks would
be enhanced by the knowledge that the whole property of the partners could be attached in cases of failure. This
knowledge encouraged people to hold banknotes especially if the partners were men of substance.”).
30
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including merchants and landed gentlemen of the region. The goal was to “involve a major
part of the town’s business community in the bank. It was to be a town’s affair in the most
complete sense.”31 As another example, the Banking Company of Aberdeen, formed in 1767,
had 297 partners. By having such a large number of wealthy partners sign up for unlimited
liability, “the Banking Company of Aberdeen flattered itself that ‘their Security will be
allowed nothing inferior to any Bank or Company in Europe.”32 The partners of Ship Bank
also fit the mold. According to Boase:
The town mansions of these gentlemen are worth noticing. That of Provost
Colin Dunlop, the leading partner of the banking firm, and great-grand-father
of the present James Dunlop, Esq., of Tollcross, . . . Dunlop Street was named
after him, and carried through his garden behind the mansion. The residence
of Mr Houston was a little further west. . . Mr Macdowal’s was the princely
edifice so well known in Glasgow story. . . popularly known as “The Shawfield
Mansion.”33
Some of these banks with unlimited liability had hundreds of partners. For instance, the
Commercial Banking Company had 508 partners and the National Bank of Scotland had
1,238 partners.34
Scottish bank notes were successful in a limited geographical area because the identities of
the bank partners, who faced unlimited liability, were typically well-known rich individuals.
Users of the notes knew who the bank partners were. But there was a problem: The notes
could not circulate very far away because, at a distant location, people would not know the
identities of the bank partners.35
During this period, Scottish banks did experience bank runs and failures. According to Munn,
“war with revolutionary France in 1793 caused a run on the banks. In the rush for liquidity
two Glasgow banks failed.”36 In 1797, there was another bank run, following rumors of a
French invasion of England and banks had to suspend payments.37 Furthermore, Checkland

31

S. G. Checkland (1975), SCOTTISH BANKING, A HISTORY, 1695-1973 (1975) at 115.

32

Id.

C. W. Boase, A CENTURY OF BANKING IN DUNDEE (1867) at 16. See also Friedman & Schwartz, supra note 2, at
50 (“Scotland was an old, established community, with a relatively stable population, so that stockholders
consisted in the main of persons who were well-known, had considerable private wealth and valued their own
reputations for probity highly enough to honor their obligations”).
33

34

Sir John Clapham, THE BANK OF ENGLAND, A HISTORY (1970) at 91.

See Munn, supra note 30, at 22 (noting that “most provincial bank notes had a purely local circulation in and
around their place of issue”).
35

36

Id. at 49.

37

Id. at 54.
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notes that there were banking panics in 1810-11, 1818-19, 1825-26, 1836-37, 1839, and 184547.38
The Scottish free banking example has been trumpeted by some as a demonstration that free
banking worked well.39 And compared to, say, English banking at the same time, it seems
that Scottish free banking did work well. Our point is that the circulation of privately
produced monies in Scotland was accompanied by very special conditions. Those informationsensitive monies were supported by unlimited liability against the wealthiest individuals in
Scottish society and circulated only within a narrow geographic area.
2. English Inland Bills of Exchange
The same problem of individual identities (i.e., information sensitivity) arose with English
inland bills of exchange. 40 Inland bills of exchange, where all parties to the bill were in
England, were a unique form of private money that circulated predominantly as a hand-tohand currency in the industrial north of England in the latter half of the 18th and first half
of the 19th centuries.
Inland bills of exchange arose in the industrial north of England as a hand-to-hand currency
due to a constrained supply of specie. Workers were paid with coins, which were scarce.
Society needed an alternative form of money. But English banks were weak. During the 17th
and most of the 18th century, English banks were limited to no more than six partners—
unlike Scottish banks, which had dozens or hundreds of backing partners. Though the
English bank partners faced unlimited liability, the limited number of backing partners
resulted in banks that often failed. While inland bills of exchange were debt, such bills were
not produced by banks and differed from bank debt, such as bank notes or deposits, in
fundamental ways.41
Bills of exchange circulated via indorsement,42 putting each indorsers’ wealth at risk if the
borrower failed. This was the key feature: All parties indorsing the bill were liable. According
to Tournay:

38

Checkland, supra note 31, at 403.

Munn’s comment on this debate is instructive: “I feel that the debate tends to force history into a strait-jacket
of economic theory which, like all strait-jackets, is very uncomfortable.” Charles Munn, Comment on Chapter 2,
in UNREGULATED BANKING: CHAOS OR ORDER? edited by Forrest Cappie and Geoffrey Wood (1991) at 68.
39

See Gary B. Gorton, Private Money Production Without Banks, NBER Working Paper No. 26663 (2020),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w26663.
40

Henry Thornton, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE PAPER CURRENCY ON GREAT BRITAIN (1802)
at 44-45 (noting that “Liverpool and Manchester effect the whole of their larger mercantile payments not by
country bank notes, of which none are issued by the banks, but by bills at one or two months due”).
41

It also helped that, in the industrial north, the population was denser than in agricultural areas, and more
literate.
42
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The indorsee or holder of a bill transferable by indorsement, is entitled to look
to the acceptor for payment, and in case of non-payment by him when
presented, then to the drawer and the last and all intermediate indorsers, or
parties whose names are on the bill; the last indorser or any intermediate
indorser, after payment as holder, is entitled to look to the acceptor and drawer,
and all his preceding indorsers, to refund him; the drawer being entitled to
look to the acceptor for payment. In the case of a note, the maker stands, as
has been already observed, in the position of the acceptor.43
The joint liability rule meant that the receiver of a bill in payment needed to know the
identities of at least one of the parties indorsing the bill and to also believe that this person
was substantive. And knowledge of the identities of those other indorsers in the chain would
make the bill even more credible.44 The front and back of a typical bill is shown below.

43

Stewart Tournay, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE (1851) at 40-41.

T. S. Ashton, The Bill of Exchange and Private Banks in Lancashire, 1790-1830, 15 ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW
25, 26 (1945) (observing that “since each successive holder indorsed it, the more it circulated the greater the
number of guarantors of its ultimate payment into cash”). See also Knut Wicksell, INTEREST AND PRICES (1936) at
63 (“While every expansion of simple credit is necessarily bound up with increasing risk, the security of a bill as
a commercial instrument increases with the number of indorsements it carries and consequently with the number
of money payments that it has provided the means of obviating”).
44
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In sum, both Scottish bank notes and English inland bills of exchange tell a similar story.
Users had to know the identity and creditworthiness of the counterparty. The monies were
information-sensitive. Consequently, bills only circulated in a narrow geographical region. As
described by Burgess:
In the manufacturing districts of Yorkshire and Lancashire, no man, generally
speaking, thinks of paying for any commodity above the value of ten pounds,
otherwise than in a bill after date. This practice is now very general throughout
the northern and midland counties, and is increasing in other parts. . . A bill
for £100 payable after date, which to-day is paid at Folkingham for wool, tomorrow at Melton for horned cattle, the next at Leicester for sheep, and the
succeeding day at Oundle for bark, is as much a part of the circulating medium,
representing the transfer of commodities from hand to hand, as a bank-note
for £100.45
According to Google Maps, Folkingham to Melton is 46 km (28.6 miles), Melton to Leicester
is 27 km (16.8 miles), and Leicester to Oundle is 57 km (35.4 miles). The total distance is 130
km (80.8 miles).
B. Information-Sensitive Monies Circulating with Limited Liability
We next turn to an example of information-sensitive money that circulated with limited
liability. Prior to the U.S. Civil War, banks issued their own private bank notes. Banks could
open by obtaining a charter granted by a state legislature or, in free banking states, they
could deposit the requisite bonds with the state treasurer and issue the corresponding
amount of notes. During the Free Banking Era of 1836-1863, eighteen states adopted a
version of free banking and fifteen retained the chartered banking system.
At that time, the government did not print money, and there was a shortage of specie.46
Private bank notes were used widely as an alternative.47 The notes could be redeemed at par
on demand at the issuing bank. Indeed, within a nearby vicinity of the issuing bank, the
notes circulated at par. However, these private bank notes circulated at discounts away from
the issuing banks. For example, a bank’s notes might trade at a 10 percent discount 100 miles
away from the issuing bank (i.e., a one-dollar note was only worth 90 cents at the distant

Henry Burgess, A letter to the Right Hon. George Canning: to explain in what manner the industries of the people
and the productions of the country are connected with and influenced by internal bills of exchange, BRISTOL
SELECTED PAMPHLETS (1826) at 19-20, http://www.jstor.org/stable/60248126.
45

As the reader can probably tell by now, a shortage of specie was a common theme motivating the proliferation
of privately produced money.
46

See William M. Gouge, A SHORT HISTORY OF PAPER MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES (1833) at 57 (observing that
““of large payments, 999 in a 1,000 are made with paper. Of small payments, 99 in a 100. The currency of the
country is . . . essentially a paper currency”).
47
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location). At a distance, the note discounts reflected risk factors of the issuing bank. 48
Roughly 1,500 bank notes of different banks circulated, depending on the year. Consequently,
there was a well-developed market for bank notes with fluctuating discounts.
Newspapers that published the discounts on notes covered bank notes from many distant
banks. Van Court’s Bank Note Reporter, published in Philadelphia, covered a total of 3,089
banks in 35 states, territories, and provinces of Canada. Van Court’s coverage is shown in
Table 3 below.49
Table 3: Coverage of Van Court’s Bank Note Reporter
States with Complete Coverage

States with Incomplete Coverage50

United States
Alabama
Connecticut
Delaware
Washington, DC
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Montana
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Vermont

United States
Arkansas
Florida
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Mississippi
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Virginia
Wisconsin

Canada
Canada51
Nova Scotia

Canada
New Brunswick

States Listed as
“Uncertain” or
Not Listed
Iowa territory
Minnesota
Missouri
Texas

Notably, bank note reporters were published in many cities. Larger cities had more than one
bank note reporter, as shown in Table 4 below.52 Thus, unlike Scottish bank notes or English
inland bills of exchange, U.S. private bank notes were more extensively used across various
geographic regions.

See Gary B. Gorton, Reputation Formation in Early Bank Note Markets, 104 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 346
(1996).
48

49

This table is from Gary B. Gorton, Pricing Free Bank Notes, 44 JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 33 (1999).

Incomplete coverage means that the Van Court Bank Note Reporter did not quote a price for banks in that state
than month. The state may have been listed, though, and the notes of banks in that state described as “all
uncertain.” Date in parentheses indicate periods for which the data was missing.
50

51

Canada includes banks located in provinces other than Nova Scotia or New Brunswick.

52

This table is from William Dillistin, BANK NOTE REPORTERS AND COUNTERFEIT DETECTORS, 1826-1866 (1943).
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Table 4: Number of Bank Note Reporters at Different
Business Centers
Location
Number of Reporters
New York City
Boston
Buffalo
Chicago
Cincinnati
Detroit
Hartford
Montreal
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
St. Louis
Zanesville, Ohio

22
3
2
4
12
2
1
1
7
4
4
1

Where did the discounts come from? They came from secondary markets where note brokers
would trade the notes of distant banks and, if deemed profitable, take them back to the
issuing bank for redemption (i.e., arbitrage). Bank note reporters published the discounts
from these markets.53 Clearly, the system was cumbersome and inefficient, but there was no
credible alternative. An example of a critique of the system was given by Whitney:
The businessman of to-day knows little by the experience and inconvenience
and loss suffered by the merchant of sixty years ago arising from the currency
in which debts were paid. Receiving payment in bank notes, he assorted them
into two parcels, current and uncurrent. In the first he placed notes issued by
solvent banks of his own city; in the other the bills of all other banks. Upon
these latter there was a discount varying in amount according to the location
and credit of the bank issuing them. How great the discount he could learn
only by consulting his “Bank Note Reporter,” or by inquiring at the nearest
exchange office. He could neither deposit them nor use them in payment of his
notes at a bank. The discount on them varies from one percent upwards,
according to the distance the bills had to be sent for redemption and the
financial standing of the bank by which they were issued. 54
The system of private bank notes ended when the National Bank Act was passed in 1863 and
a prohibitively high tax on bank notes was adopted, effectively ending their existence.

See William O. Scroggs, A CENTURY
used).
53

OF

BANKING PROGRESS (1924) at 160 (describing how the reporters were

See John J. Knox, HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES (1903) at 365 (quoting D. R. Whitney, who was
the president of the Suffolk Bank in Massachusetts and published a book on the bank in 1878).
54
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***
We can tease out a few useful insights from the cases of Scottish free banking, English inland
bills of exchange, and U.S. bank notes prior to the Civil War. First, parties using these monies
had an incentive to produce information. In Scotland, holders of bank notes needed to know
the identity of the (very wealthy) partners who supported the bank because those partners
were subject to unlimited liability. In England, holders of the indorsed bills needed to know
the identity of those who indorsed. The wealthier, the better. In the United States, those who
used private bank notes had to know the health of the underlying bank and depended on
third-party reporters for that information. Information mattered, and parties had an
incentive to obtain that information.
Second, these monies either circulated successfully within a narrow geographic region or
circulated at a discount in a broader geographic region. In Scotland and England, privately
issued monies circulated in concentrated geographic areas, largely where the identities of the
partners and guarantors were more well-known. In the United States, private bank notes
circulated much more broadly but did so at a discount that depended on distance from the
issuing bank. Such a system proved to be highly inefficient.
Finally, because the private monies were information-sensitive, they were not always safe. In
both the Scottish and American examples, bank runs and bank failures occurred. This theme
of financial fragility plays a significant role in the path from coexistence to sovereign
monopoly, which we explore in the next Part.
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Part III. The Emergence of the Sovereign’s Money Monopoly
Our view is that the best way the evaluate proposed changes to the legal and financial
architecture is by looking to history. Market economies have an inherent structure, and
circulating money is part of that structure. History shows that there were, and are, good
reasons for a government monopoly on the production of a circulating currency.
Specifically, in this Part, we review the historical legislative and policy debates surrounding
the creation and operation of sovereign money in England, the United States, Canada, and
Sweden. England was the first to create a national currency in the first half of the nineteenth
century. The United States, Canada, and Sweden started with hybrid systems in which
government money—or bonds in the case of the United States—backed the privately
produced monies. In short, the case studies show that sovereign money emerged for reasons
grounded in both politics and economics. Politically, there was a desire for increased national
unity or greater sovereignty generally. Economically, which is our focus, there were perennial
debates on financial stability (e.g., banking panics), the money supply (e.g., its inelasticity or
cyclicality), and fiscal affairs (e.g., funding the national treasury). Table 5 below highlights
the economic factors underlying the monopolies in each of our four case studies.
Table 5: Economic Reasons for the Sovereign’s Money Monopoly
Financial Stability
Money Supply
Fiscal
Considerations
Considerations
Considerations
England
X
X
X
United States
X
X
X
Canada
X
X
Sweden
X
X
X
A. England
In England, the sovereign’s money monopoly came about primarily in response to repeated
financial crises, most immediately the crises in 1835-36 and in 1839. 55 England had an
impressively long history of financial crises. During the 18th century, there were financial
crises in 1701, 1710, 1715, 1726, 1745, 1761, 1763, 1772, 1778, 1793, and 1797.56 Banks failed
frequently—at least 343 bank failures between 1750 and 1830.57 Indeed, according to Joplin’s
observations on the English banking system in 1822:
When the slightest apprehension is entertained respecting [the banks]
solvency, however groundless it may sometimes prove, a run upon the
immediately takes place. That is, hundreds of people immediately crowd the
See J. K. Horsefield, The Origins of the Bank Charter Act, 1844, 11 ECONOMICA 180, 180 (1944) (“Public opinion
was also shocked that help had had to be sought from France in order to maintain the convertibility of Bank
Notes.”).
55

56

See T.S. Ashton, ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS IN ENGLAND, 1700-1800 at 136 (1959).

57

See L. S. Presnell, COUNTRY BANKING IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION at 443 (1956).
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doors of the Banks, to demand payment of the Notes they held, or to withdraw
that money out of their hands, which they have deposited with them . . . Great
however as the inconveniences are which discredit of Banks and consequent
runs upon them occasion, and great as are the calamities by which their
failures are uniformly attended, they are, both in this country and Ireland, of
very common occurrence.58
As a result of frequent financial trauma, the Bank Charter Act of 1844—commonly known as
Peel’s Act59—granted the Bank of England a monopoly over note issuance, with a carve-out
for private banks issuing notes as of May 6, 1844.60
Peel’s Act was momentous for several reasons. First, it came during a period when free trade
principles dominated. This was no doubt the influence of Adam Smith. 61 Second, it was a
wholistic approach to the issue of bank notes, motivated by the idea that banking should be
separated from the control of the currency.62 Third, the Act is generally viewed as being the
foundation for the Bank of England to become the central bank because of the monopoly over
note issuance, which was the source of much controversy.63
The passage of Peel’s Act was also influenced by debates surrounding the money supply. The
logic of the Act came from the “Currency School,” with the view that the quantity of money
and of coin should never be allowed to differ.64 From this, it was argued that fluctuations in
the value of the standard unit would be constant and that booms and panics would be

T. Joplin, An Essay on the General Principles and Present Practice of Banking in England and Scotland (1822).
See also John A. James, Panics, Payments Disruptions and the Bank of England before 1826, 19 FINANCIAL
HISTORY REVIEW 289 (2012); Julian Hoppit, Financial Crises in Eighteenth-Century England, 39 ECONOMIC
HISTORY REVIEW 39 (1986).
58

Sir Robert Peel was the Prime Minister at that time. The real name of the Act is “An Act to regulate the Issue
of Bank Notes, and for Giving to the Governor and Company of the Bank of England certain Privileges for a
Limited Period.” The Act had three other subjects, in addition to the control of bank notes: the separation of the
departments of the Bank into the issuing department and the traditional banking department; the establishment
of fiduciary issue; and the publication of accounts.
59

60

These banks were allowed to issue in the future but could not exceed their average in early 1844.

See Arie Arnon, Banking between the Invisible and Visible Hands: A Reinterpretation of Ricardo's Place within
the Classical School, 39 OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS 268 (1987).
61

62

See P. Barrett Whale, A Retrospective View of the Bank Charter Act of 1844, 11 ECONOMICA 109 (1944).

See A DIGEST OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE BANK CHARTER, TAKEN BEFORE THE COMMITTEE OF 1832 (1833) at 187
(“The 1832 Committee. . . regarded the monopoly question as the most important issue of the day, and made
persistent enquiries into the desirability of some limitation of the country banks’ issues. Its witnesses were nearly
equally divided for and against.”). Walter Bagehot later wrote that “the issue of money is a fit case for a
Government monopoly, because the object aimed at, is not to reduce the cost price, but to render it fixed.” The
Currency Monopoly, PROSPECTIVE REVIEW (1848).
63

Opposed to the Currency School was the “Banking School,” a group centered on the idea that the issuance of
bank notes would be naturally regulated by holders wanting to redeem their notes. See J.K. Horsefield, The
Origins of the Bank Charter Act, 1844, 11 ECONOMICA 180 (1944). See also Charles Goodhart & Meinhard Jensen,
Currency School versus Banking School: An Ongoing Confrontation, 4 ECONOMIC THOUGHT 20 (2015).
64
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eliminated. “Over issuance” of notes by country banks would thus be avoided.65 Of note, those
objecting to the Bank being rechartered argued, among other points, that this created an
inelasticity which would hinder the Bank’s ability to respond to panics by increasing the
money supply, leading to panic.66
In addition to financial stability and the money supply, the debate also raised the issue of
who should profit from the Bank’s monopoly. Among those in favor of the monopoly were
voices that wanted to the profits to accrue to the government. Not everyone agreed. George
Grote, a London banker, said that he “would have the Bank of England compelled to pay over
to the public all profit from their circulation, savings so much as might be fair remuneration
for the trouble and risk of administering the details of it.”67
In the end, the debates and testimony in the Committee of 1832 led to the recharting of the
Bank of England and established the Bank’s notes as legal tender. According to Orzechowski,
the Act “fatally dashed the hopes of free bankers seeking to limit the powers of the Bank of
England. The 1833 Act set in motion the eventual elimination of private bank notes so that
by 1844 the government was able to stop the issuance of all new private bank notes in
England and Wales, thus giving the Bank of England a pure monopoly.”68
B. United States
In the United States, the road to the sovereign’s monopoly over money began during the Civil
War. In the 1860s, the government taxed state bank notes out of existence in order to support
the growth of national bank notes, which were backed by debt issued by the Treasury. In the
subsequent decades, policymakers noted significant problems associated with the inelasticity
of the money supply and the frequency of banking panics.
On February 20, 1896, Theodore Gilman, a New York City banker, appeared before the U.S.
House Committee on Banking and Currency and introduced a bill that would give private
bank clearinghouses the ability to issue money backed by their members’ assets. Section 9 of
the proposed legislation stated:
That a clearing house of issue shall be authorized and empowered to receive
from its bank members, or any clearing house within the State or district in
which it is located, commercial assets, promissory notes, bills of exchange,
See, e.g., Letter to Charles Wood, Esq., M.P., Chairman of the Committee of the House of Commons on Banks of
Issue (1841).
65

The critics who focused on the inelasticity of the Bank’s ability to respond to a crisis came true in the Panic of
1847, which saw a suspension of that restriction. See Rudiger Dornbusch & Jacob Frenkel, The Gold Standard
Crisis of 1847, 16 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 1 (1984) (“The removal of the restriction on fiat money
issue dispensed with the concern for the internal convertibility of deposits into notes.”).
66

Testimony of George Grote, A DIGEST OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE BANK CHARTER, TAKEN BEFORE THE COMMITTEE OF
1832 (1833) at 97.
67

Paul E. Orzechowski, George Scrope, Free Bankers, and the Bank Charter Act of 1833, ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC &
BUSINESS HISTORY (2019) at 182.
68
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convertible bonds and stocks, and other securities and evidence of debt as
collateral security for the circulating notes of the said association to be issued.69
The collateral was to have a 25 percent haircut and the notes issued would be guaranteed
by all the clearinghouse members jointly.
The Hearings were motivated by the perceived weaknesses of the National Banking System
that had been created during the Civil War. The main complaints alleged against the existing
banking system were the inelasticity of the money supply and the frequency of banking
panics. The inelasticity was due to the structure of system. The United States had adopted a
hybrid system of money in 1863 with the National Bank Act. The Act created banks called
national banks, which could issue their own “national bank notes,” but required that these
notes be backed by U.S. Treasury bonds. The purpose of requiring that national bank notes
be backed by Treasuries was intended to create a demand for Treasury securities which could
be issued to finance the North during the Civil War. By linking the bank notes to U.S.
Treasuries, the money supply could not be changed easily. This inelasticity of the money
supply was widely noted.70
Moreover, the National Bank Act of 1863 was expected to end panics since the national bank
notes would be backed by U.S. Treasuries. But the National Bank Act did not end banking
panics. There were seven major banking panics during the National Banking Era. In those
panics, depositors wanted to withdraw their “deposits” in “cash” (i.e., in national bank
notes).71 Deposits had started outstripping bank notes prior to the Civil War.
Thus, the basis for Gilman’s proposal was that private bank clearinghouses were the
institutions responding to banking panics. In a banking panic, clearinghouses opened a
discount window where members could post collateral and receive “clearinghouse loan
certificates,” which were the joint liability of the member banks.72 Alas, the clearinghouse
system could not prevent panics even if it could mitigate some of the bad effects of panics. Six
years after the devastating panic of 1907, Congress established the Federal Reserve, the socalled central bank, “to furnish an elastic currency. . . and to establish a more effective
supervision of banking in the United States.” 73 The Federal Reserve was also to provide
financial stability. Both goals, an elastic money supply and financial stability, were to be

Banking and Currency Reform Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency
(1913) at 90.
69

See Edwin Kemmerer, Seasonal Variations in the Relative Demand for Money and Capital in the United States,
NATIONAL MONETARY COMMISSION (1910) at 13 (“The most common criticism of our American currency system is
its alleged inelasticity or irresponsiveness to trade demands, this inelasticity is sometimes considered with
particular reference to panic periods which occur at more or less irregular and widely separated times, and
sometimes with particular reference to regularly recurring seasonal fluctuations in the demand for money and
loanable capital.”).
70

71

See Gary Gorton, Banking Panics and Business Cycles, 40 OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS 751 (1988).

72

See Gary Gorton & Ellis Tallman, FIGHTING FINANCIAL CRISES (2018).

73

See Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
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accomplished by setting up a permanent discount window. Further, the national currency
would have to be de-linked from U.S. Treasuries. For all these reasons, the United States
migrated to a single uniform sovereign currency.
C. Canada
In Canada, the sovereign’s monopoly over money coincided with the establishment of its
central bank. Coming out of the Great Depression in the early 20th century, Canada’s
political leadership recognized the need for greater control of its money supply as well as
greater financial stability.
In October 1929, the U.S. stock market collapsed, and economic depression ensued in North
America and around the world. Canada was hit especially hard. The country’s GDP-toCapital ratio declined by 35 percent from the peak of 1928 to the trough of 1933, compared
to a 30 percent decline in the United States.74 As in the United States, Canadian farmers
were among the hardest hit during the Depression. They were paying 7 percent on mortgages
that had been signed in the 1920s but their products were selling for less than one half of
their 1926 values.75
Canada had no central bank at the time. Farmers were in favor of having a central bank;
bankers were opposed. Finally, in 1933, during the fourth year of the Depression, the Royal
Commission on Banking and Currency was established to review the banking system and the
Canadian government’s involvement in monetary policy. 76 The commission was chaired by
Hugh Macmillan. The commission held hearings throughout Canada and delivered a report.
After surveying the Canadian banking and financial system, the Report states:
If we survey the cardinal monetary problems which face the Canadian people
in common with all other peoples today, we are immediately confronted with a
multitude of difficult and intricate questions. To what extent and through what
organizations should the volume of credit and of currency be regulated? On
what body should lie the primary responsibility for maintaining the external
stability of the country’s currency? To what institution may the Government of
the day suitably turn for informed and impartial advice on matters of financial
policy? . . . In the great, and an increasing, majority of countries the answer to
these questions had been found in the existence of or the creation of a central
bank.

74

Joe Martin, THE CREATION OF THE BANK OF CANADA (2005).

75

Id.

76

REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON BANKING AND CURRENCY IN CANADA (1933) (emphasis added).
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The Bank of Canada was thereby chartered in 1934 when the Bank of Canada Act was passed,
and the bank became operational in March 1935.77 The Preamble of the Act states:78
Whereas it is desirable to establish a central bank in Canada to regulate credit
and currency in the best interests of the economic life of the nation, to control
and protect the external value of the national monetary unit and to mitigate
by its influence fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices
and employment, so far as may be possible within the scope of monetary action,
and generally to promote the economic and financial welfare of the dominion.
Section 24 of the Act gave the bank the sole right to issue notes payable to the bearer on
demand and issue notes in any amount. Thus, in the case of Canada, like many other
countries, the establishment of a monopoly over the production of money coincided with the
founding of the central bank. The reasoning was that the central bank needed monopoly
control over money production to fulfill its role as an overseer of the macroeconomy.79
Another motivating factor was the elasticity of the money supply, particularly whether it was
elastic enough to address seasonality associated with crops being planted and harvested.
According to Kianief,
Pressure was brought to bear on the money supply mechanism during the cropmoving season, when demand for credit would reach its peak. . . . The year
1907 proved to be a bad one for both the wheat and banking industries, as a
low-quality wheat crop had to be moved to market quickly to avoid
deterioration. At the time, however, demand for notes was greater than their
supply, and the banks could not provide them fast enough to facilitate
movement of the crop. The crisis was symptomatic of the larger issue of the
inelasticity of the money supply.80
To be sure, political issues played a role as well. 81 In the west of Canada there was anti-bank
sentiment due to high interest rates and a perceived lack of sufficient credit. And more
generally, the public was concerned with the concentration of bank ownership and the banks’

77

Bank of Canada Act, https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/act_loi_boc_bdc.pdf.

78

Id.

See Muharem Kianieff, Private Banknotes in Canada from 1867 (and before) to 1950, 30 QUEEN’S LAW JOURNAL
400 (2004) (“The financial system’s failure to respond adequately to the challenges of the Depression led to the
establishment of the Bank of Canada in 1935, over the objections of many private bankers. The legislation that
set up the Bank of Canada provided for a gradual phasing out of private banknotes and their replacement of notes
issued by the Bank of Canada.”).
79

80

Id. at 425.

See Michael D. Bordo & Angela Redish, Why Did the Bank of Canada Emerge in 1935?, 47 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
HISTORY 405.
81
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influence over the economy through interlocking directorships. The period from 1901 to 1914
was one of bank failures, liquidations, and mergers.
***
Similar to the U.S. experience described previously, the Canadian expensive also included a
circulation of government notes prior to the establishment of a central bank. Specifically, the
Canadian government issued “Dominion notes” from 1867 to 1934.
Before the various provinces of Canada were united into what we now know as Canada,
provinces issued their own notes. Confederation occurred in 1868 and, with confederation,
the Dominion government acquired the right of issuing notes, taking over this function from
the provinces.82 The Dominion Notes Act of 1868 allowed the government to issue its own
notes backed by gold. The Act restricted private bank notes to a minimum denomination of
$4, leaving a monopoly to the government to issue notes of $4 or less. In today’s terms, $4
would be $97.87 Canadian dollars in 2022 (or $78.54 U.S. dollars). Thus, Dominion notes
were used to carry out most day-to-day transactions.
Moreover, Dominion notes were used as reserves by the commercial banks.83 This suggests
that Dominion notes were the practical hand-to-hand currency. Canadian banks were never
required to satisfy a specific level of reserves. But banks were always required to hold at least
40 percent of whatever cash reserves the banks held. Figure 1 below shows the percentage of
bank reserves that were Dominion notes.84

“Confederation” refers to New Brunswick and Nova Scotia official joining the Province of Canada. The Province
of Canada then split into Ontario and Quebec.
82

These calculations are based on Historical Statistics of Canada, Table K33-43, General Wholesale Price Index,
1867-1975. The Historical Statistics only goes through 1975. For 1975 until 2022 we used
https://www.in2013dollars.com/canada/inflation/1975?amount=21.45.
83

84

The data are from C. A. Curtis, STATISTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANADIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY, VOL 1, STATISTICS
(1931).
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Figure 1: Ratio of Dominion Notes to Total Reserves

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Even though Dominion notes made Canadian currency relatively sound, still, they were
relatively small compared to private bank notes, as shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Ratio of Dominion Notes to Chartered Bank Notes
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As in the U.S. experience, private bank notes circulated in Canada because of a lack of specie,
and circulated at discounts. That these information-sensitive Canadian bank notes did not
circulate at par in all parts of the country was a common complaint.85
Various laws were enacted in attempts to eliminate these discounts: The Bank Act of 1871
imposed double liability on bank shareholders. The Bank Act of 1880 gave note holders first
lien on bank assets. And the Bank Act of 1890 established the Bank Circulation Fund to
redeem the notes of insolvent bank and for note holders to be paid interest as well. Banks
were required to pay 5 percent of their previous 12 months’ circulation to the Minister of
Finance to form this Fund.86
***
The Canadian system, like the pre-Civil War system in the U.S. and like other countries,
began with private bank notes that traded at discounts. The system evolved into a hybrid
system where Dominion notes were used as reserves for the banks. The sovereign’s monopoly
over money coincided with the establishment of its central bank. Coming out of the Great
Depression in the early 20th century, Canada’s political leadership recognized the need for
greater control of its money supply as well as greater financial stability.
D. Sweden
Sweden’s debate over the sovereign’s money monopoly revolved around financial stability,
first and foremost, but also the desire to capture the gains of seigniorage for fiscal policy and
concerns regarding the ability to control its money supply.
Private banks in Sweden—known as Enskilda banks—issued their own bank notes from 1831
to 1904. Interestingly, Sweden already had public money at the time, so why did Swedish
private currency circulate when there was already a public currency in circulation? The
Riksbank was constrained by how much money it could issue. Of note, Sweden re-established
the silver standard in 1834, which the country had abandoned in 1809.87 Thus, from 1834
until the onset of World War I, the main objective of the Riksbank was to maintain the silver

Roeliff Breckenridge, The History of Banking in Canada, NATIONAL MONETARY COMMISSION (1910) at 112
(“Being a frequent annoyance, the discount for geographical reasons constituted no inconsiderable grievance.”).
85

See Ben Fung, Scott Hendry & Warren Weber, Canadian Bank Notes and Dominion Notes: Lessons for Digital
Currencies, Bank of Canada Working Paper 2017-5 (“[B]ank notes were only relatively safe and not a uniform
currency before 1890. They were relatively safe because only 3 of the 55 banks in existence between 1866 and
1890 failed with losses to note holders. They were not a uniform currency because notes of banks in one geographic
location often traded at a discount in another location and notes of suspended banks traded at a discount until
the bank’s affairs were settled. The Bank Act of 1890 made bank notes perfectly safe and a uniform currency.”).
86

See Anders Ögren, Free or Central Banking? Liquidity and Financial Deepening in Sweden, 1834-1913, 43
EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 64 (2006).
87
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standard. As a result, there was a shortage of money in Sweden during the 19th century.88
According to Ögren:
The initial extent of Swedish poverty during this period is well illustrated by
the very limited and stagnant circulation of metallic coins, as well as a supply
of specie metal insufficient to provide the country with an adequate supply of
generally accepted means of payments. Instead, the Swedish economy relied
heavily on personal credits, IOUs, and other types of informal means of
payments, accepted only on a personal or regional basis, thus hindering more
widespread economic integration.89
Enskilda banks therefore contributed to economic expansion and integration by providing a
money supply beyond what would have been possible for the Riksbank.90 In fact, by 1859, the
volume of private bank notes in circulation exceeded that of Riksbank notes in circulation.91
Private bank notes were sent all over the country, not just to certain (rural) areas.92 Following
the proliferation of this new money supply, economic growth increased dramatically in the
subsequent decades.93
***
Of note, the system of Enskilda banks was not entirely private for a couple of reasons. First,
Enskilda banks’ note issuance was backed by, and redeemed for, money issued by the
Riksbank. This was a form of “bottom-up” central banking because the Enskilda banks
voluntarily relied on Riksbank notes rather than specie for reserves. Indeed, the holdings of
Riksbank notes by Enskilda banks were between 30 percent and 50 percent through the
1860s. Before Sweden passed the 1874 law—a law that required Enskilda banks to back their
note issuance with gold—Enskilda banks held almost zero specie as reserves. 94

Moreover, the Riksbank initially issued denominations that were more useful for wholesale payments than
retail payments. Enskilda banks were able to fill the initial vacuum by issuing notes of lower denominations. See
Lars Jonung, Private Bank Notes in Sweden 1831–1902, Mimeo, Stockholm School of Economics (2007).
88

89

See Ögren, supra note 87.

See Gabriel Söderberg, Why Did the Riksbank Get a Monopoly on Banknotes?, SVERIGES RIKSBANK ECONOMIC
REVIEW (2018) (noting that Enskilda banks were allowed by the Swedish Riksdag in 1824 as a conscious strategy
to promote the growth of a banking system in Sweden).
90

See Anders Ögren, Empirical Studies in Money, Credit and Banking: The Swedish Credit Market in Transition
under the Silver and the Gold Standards, 1834-1913, EHF – Stockholm School of Economics, Studies in Economic
History No. 2 (2003).
91

See Torbjörn Engdahl and Anders Ögren, Multiple Paper Monies in Sweden 1789-1903: Substitution or
Complementarity?, 15 FINANCIAL HISTORY REVIEW 73 (2008).
92

See Anders Ögren, Financial Revolution and Economic Modernization in Sweden, 16 FINANCIAL HISTORY
REVIEW 47 (2009).
93

94

See Ögren, supra note 87. See also Söderberg, supra note 90.
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Second, according to Fung, Hendry, and Weber, the Riksbank acted as a lender of last resort
for the Enskilda banks on at least two occasions—first during the crisis of 1856-1857 and
second during the crisis of 1878-1879.95
This instability concern was not lost upon the government when it made its final decision to
ban private bank notes and give the monopoly to the central bank. Indeed, following that
second crisis in 1878-79, public opinion turned against the Enskilda banks. A newly formed
special committee on banking recommended that the Riksbank be granted a monopoly on the
issuance of notes.96
That final decision arrived in 1897 when the Riskbank was given a monopoly on note issuance,
and the Enskilda bank notes went out of circulation shortly thereafter. In its decision to ban
private bank notes, the Swedish government cited banking panics (i.e., financial stability),97
the credit cycle (i.e., controlling the money supply),98 and seigniorage (i.e., public finance).99
E. Insights for Coexistence v. Monopoly
The present assumption is that privately issued money should circulate alongside sovereign
money. Members of Congress have expressed these views, as have senior officials at the
Federal Reserve. Should we maintain the sovereign’s money monopoly? Or should we turn
back the clock? The historical case studies suggest that turning back the clock would mean
having to relitigate many of the financial stability, money supply, and fiscal concerns.
Financial stability considerations played a significant role in bringing about the sovereign’s
monopoly over money. In every one of the case studies analyzed in this Part—England, the
United States, Canada, and Sweden—financial stability concerns were front and center. In
England, banks failed frequently—at least 343 bank failures between 1750 and 1830. During
the U.S. National Banking Era, bank runs on deposits occurred frequently. In Canada, the

See Ben Fung, Scott Hendry & Warren E. Weber, Swedish Riksbank Notes and Enskilda Bank Notes: Lessons
for
Digital
Currencies,
Bank
of
Canada
Staff
Working
Paper
2018-27
(2018),
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2018/06/staff-working-paper-2018-27/.
95

96

See Ögren, supra note 87.

See Söderberg, supra note 90, at 12 (citing Bankkomitén (1883), Bankkomiténs underdåniga förslag till
förändrad organisation af bankanstalterna [Special Committee on Banking– proposed changes in bank
organization]) (“It was emphasized that, even if the private banknotes were relatively secure, their security would
be even higher if they were issued by a single institution.”)
97

See id. (noting the concern that “that banknote issuance will be too extensive in good times and too restricted
in bad times”).
98

In addition, there was seasonality in the private money supply. The notes issued by Enskilda banks followed a
seasonal pattern, which corresponded with the seasonal demand for liquidity of the agricultural cycle. Specifically,
there were two peaks per year—one from February to April and the second from October to November. See
Engdahl & Ögren, supra note 92.
See Söderberg, supra note 90, at 12 (“Seigniorage is necessary to fund a central bank’s social function so that it
does not need to act according to a profit motive.”).
99
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monopoly coincided with the founding of the central bank, during a financial crisis. In Sweden,
the Riksbank had to stand ready to intervene and there were still banking panics. This is not
surprising. Consistent with economic theory, privately produced monies are informationsensitive and therefore prone to destabilizing bank runs. The same is true of privately
produced digital money like stablecoins. Indeed, we have recently seen stablecoins lose their
pegs as market volatility increased.
Control over the money supply also factored into the monopoly debates. Countries were
naturally concerned with the money supply because it was a shortage of specie that led to the
proliferation of privately produced monies in their economies. In the United States, for
example, lawmakers were concerned with the inelasticity of the money supply because
national bank notes had to be backed by U.S. Treasury bonds. In Canada, the central bank
was given monopoly control over money production to fulfill its role as an overseer of the
macroeconomy. Giving the sovereign a monopoly over money explicitly allows the central
bank to conduct countercyclical monetary policy.
Finally, fiscal affairs were considered in the granting of the monopoly. In the debates
surrounding Peel’s Act in England, some favored giving the Bank of England a monopoly
because its monopoly profits would accrue to the government. During the U.S. Civil War, the
government taxed state bank notes out of existence to support the growth of national bank
notes, which were backed by debt issued by the Treasury. In Sweden, certain legislators had
argued that seigniorage should not accrue to the private Enskilda banks.
***
Privately issued money began to circulate because of a shortage of sovereign money. During
the U.S. Free Banking Era, for instance, the government did not print money and there was
a shortage of coins, so private bank notes were used pervasively. Similarly, in Sweden, there
was a very limited and stagnant circulation of metallic coins as well as a limited supply of
specie metal insufficient to provide the country with an adequate supply of generally accepted
means of payments. There simply weren’t enough metallic coins to go around, and that
shortage was holding back economic development. Private institutions filled the gap by
issuing their own money, and the sovereigns permitted coexistence (for a time). There were
no better alternatives.
Stablecoins provide liquidity and collateral on cryptocurrency exchanges. There were no
better alternatives in terms of a circulating digital currency. But now, there is a better
alternative to stablecoins: a central bank digital currency. Reintroducing coexistence between
private (digital) money and sovereign (digital) money would bring about similar costs to
financial stability, monetary policy, and fiscal policy for an unclear upside.
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Part IV. The State of Play
A. Runs and Contagion
Stablecoins are vulnerable to runs. An “algorithmic stablecoin”100 has already crashed and
burned. 101 In May 2022, the decline in the price of Bitcoin and the death spiral of the
algorithmic stablecoin, TerraUSD, were enough to knock some stablecoins off their pegs. For
instance, Tether, the largest stablecoin at over $75 billion in market capitalization, dipped
below $0.97, as shown in Figure 3. Tether holders withdrew $7 billion from Tether during
the panic.102
Figure 3: Tether’s Peg in May 2022
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Algorithmic stablecoins work something like this: There are two coins, say, $1Coin and another coin, OCoin.
$1Coin is supposed to be pegged to $1, while the price of OCoin can be anything. The idea is that if $1Coin trades
at $0.99 then there is a process by which more OCoins are printed and used to buy $1Coins until the price is $1
again. If $1Coind trades at $1.01, then the process allows some more $1Coins to be printed and used to buy OCoins
until the price is back to $1. Of course, neither $1Coin or OCoin are worth anything, so this is just a fancy kind of
fiat cryptocurrency. In our discussions of stablecoins, we are concerned with those that are backed by cash and
safe assets, are pegged to a fiat currency like the U.S. dollar, and are redeemable on demand. Our analysis is not
focused on algorithmic stablecoins.
100

Those runs were on the stablecoins IRON Titanium and TerraUSD. For details on IRON, see Kanis Saengchote,
A DeFi Bank Run: Iron Finance, IRON Stablecoin. And the Fall of TITAN, SSRN Working Paper (2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3888089; Kevin Reynolds, In Token Crash Postmortem, Iron
Finance Says It Suffered Crypto's First Large-Scale Bank Run, COINDESK (Jun. 17, 2021),
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2021/06/17/in-token-crash-postmortem-iron-finance-says-it-suffered-cryptosfirst-large-scale-bank-run/. For more details on TerraUSD, see Amit Chaudhary & Ganesh Viswanath-Natraj,
Algorithmic Stablecoins and Devaluation Risk, VoxEU (May 13, 2022), https://voxeu.org/article/algorithmicstablecoins-and-devaluation-risk.
101

Scott Chipolina, Investors Pull $7bn from Tether As Stablecoin Jitters Intensify, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 17,
2022), https://www.ft.com/content/db9c3f32-cd91-4149-9788-95b2046bea10.
102
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The run on Tether was a preview of the future. This should not be surprising given what we
know from economic theory and what we have witnessed over the past few centuries. As noted
in the historical analysis in Part III, financial stability considerations were prominent in
bringing about the sovereign’s monopoly over money in England, the United States, Canada,
and Sweden. In England, there were hundreds of bank failures during the 18th and 19th
centuries. In the United States, bank runs occurred frequently in the 19th century, before
the establishment of the Federal Reserve and deposit insurance. In Canada, the central bank
gained its monopoly because of a financial crisis. In Sweden, bank failures similarly led to
the sovereign’s monopoly.
Consistent with economic theory, privately produced money is information-sensitive and
therefore prone to destabilizing bank runs. The same is true of privately produced digital
money like stablecoins. Indeed, when collateral backing privately produced money is not
regulated—or simply do not exist—the fixed price of that money will not hold in times of
stress. In that case, the quantities adjust to zero in a bank run. Yet the underlying
assumption for the path forward is one of private money circulating alongside sovereign
money.
Notably, this is just the case for a sovereign’s monopoly based on financial stability. The
efficacy of monetary policy also matters. As countries in our case studies discovered, giving
the sovereign a monopoly over money explicitly allows the central bank to conduct
countercyclical monetary policy. Otherwise, the production of private money would be suboptimally high during economic booms and be sub-optimally depressed during economic
downturns.
B. Legislative and Regulatory Proposals
Despite the potential concerns associated with financial stability, monetary policy, and even
fiscal policy, every approach presently espoused by legislators and regulators is one of wellregulated coexistence. We discuss a few examples below.
Senator Pat Toomey proposed a bill titled ‘‘Stablecoin Transparency of Reserves and Uniform
Safe Transactions Act of 2022’’ or the ‘‘Stablecoin TRUST Act of 2022.”103 Importantly, the
Act would require the stablecoin issuer to back its coins with assets that satisfy the following
conditions:
(f) STABLECOIN RESERVES.—Payment stablecoins issued by a national limited
payment stablecoin issuer shall be backed with assets—
(1) with a market value equal to not less than 100 percent of the par value of
the payment stablecoins outstanding; and
See Stablecoin Transparency of Reserves and Uniform Safe Transactions Act, S.___, 117th Cong. (2022),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/the_stablecoin_trust_act.pdf.
103
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(2) that are cash and cash equivalents or level 1 high-quality liquid assets
denominated in United States dollars.104
In addition, the stablecoin issuer would have to disclose its backing on a regular basis:
(a) IN GENERAL.—Any person described in section 3(b) that issues a payment
stablecoin shall—
(1) publicly disclose the assets backing the payment stablecoin on a monthly
basis;
(2) adopt and publicly disclose policies for redeeming the payment stablecoin,
including whether redemption requests will be met on demand or with a time
lag;
(3) undergo quarterly attestations by a registered public accounting firm and
publicly disclose the results; and
(4) attest that the assets backing the payment stablecoin do not materially
diverge from those disclosed. 105
As another example, Senators Kirsten Gillibrand and Cynthia Lummis proposed the
“Responsible Financial Innovation Act” in June 2022. 106 Similar to Senator Toomey’s
proposal, the Gillibrand-Lummis proposal also requires the full backing of stablecoins and
monthly disclosures:
(b) Required Payment Stablecoin Assets.—A depository institution shall maintain
high-quality liquid assets under this section equal to not less than 100 percent of the
face amount of the liabilities of the institution on payment stablecoins issued by the
institution. …
(c) Disclosures.—Not later than 10 business days after the end of each month, a
depository institution shall disclose, in a publicly accessible manner, a summary
description of the assets backing the payment stablecoin, the value of the assets, and
the number of outstanding payment stablecoins, as of the last day of the month. 107
Senator Bill Hagerty and Representative Trey Hollingsworth proposed their “Stablecoin
Transparency Act,”108 which covers the same set of regulatory issues:

104

Id. at §6.

105

Id. at §4.

106

Responsible Financial Innovation Act, S.4356, 117th Cong. (2022).

107

Id. at §601.

108

Stablecoin Transparency Act, S.3970, 117th Cong. (2022).
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(b) Reserves.—Each stablecoin issuer shall hold all reserves associated with each fiat
currency-backed stablecoin issued by such stablecoin issuer in—
(1) government securities that have maturities of not longer than 12 months;
(2) fully collateralized security repurchase agreements; or
(3) United States dollars or any other nondigital currency.
(c) Reserve Reports.—Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act
and every 30 days thereafter, each stablecoin issuer shall publish on the website of
the stablecoin issuer a report on the reserves held by the stablecoin issuer that has
been audited by a third-party auditor.109
To the best of our knowledge, there is no legislative proposal that questions coexistence.110 If
members of Congress are not engaging in debates about coexistence and are accepting the
premise—or desiring the outcome—that private money will coexist with sovereign money,
then that assumption will most likely be reflected in the approaches by financial regulators
on the ground.
Indeed, financial regulators are currently operating within the coexistence framework. For
instance, the President’s Working Group stated: “To address risks to stablecoin users and
guard against stablecoin runs, legislation should require stablecoin issuers to be insured
depository institutions, which are subject to appropriate supervision and regulation, at the
depository institution and the holding company level.”111 The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency has also taken preliminary steps to address the financial stability risks inherent in
stablecoins,112 but within the framework of coexistence.113
***
Of note, it has been reported that the European Commission is considering a hard cap on
stablecoin issuance. In particular, regulators could order the issuers of any stablecoin
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exceeding 200 million euros and 1 million transactions daily to cease issuances until these
figures come back below the threshold. This effectively allows coexistence “up to a point” and
no further.114 Other than this report, however, most regulatory options—particularly in the
United States—have established coexistence as the baseline.
C. Circulating Money and Insurance
As discussed by Gorton and Zhang in Taming Wildcat Stablecoins, there are multiple ways
to address the run risk concern associated with private money like stablecoins. 115 One
approach is to transform stablecoin issuers into “narrow banks,” requiring each stablecoin to
be backed by short-term U.S. Treasuries or central bank reserves. (Many of the legislative
proposals lean in this direction.) But doing so may lead to unintended macroeconomic
consequences.116 In particular, uninsured holders of deposits at commercial banks might run
to the narrow stablecoin banks in times of economic uncertainty.
Another way to solve the financial stability problem posed by unregulated stablecoins is to
insure them in the same way that the FDIC currently insures deposits. Indeed, as discussed
previously, deposit insurance effectively transformed privately produced demand deposits
into sovereign money—satisfying the NQA principle and eliminating run risk.117 But is that
even possible in the current setting? Thinking about this insurance approach brings us to the
fundamental difference between stablecoins and demand deposits noted in the introduction:
Demand deposits are not designed to circulate, but stablecoins can circulate. Trying to insure
circulating stablecoins may not be feasible.
To see this argument, one first has to observe that demand deposits are account-based. They
are linked to a specific person’s account at a specific bank. In order to use deposits, Person A
can write a check to Person B. The check then must clear—that is, Person A’s account is
debited and Person B’s account is credited. Circulation of cash (or stablecoins), on the other
hand, refers to notes (or tokens) that can be exchanged from Person A to Person B to Person
C to Person D to Person E—irrespective of whether they have bank accounts. The current
deposit insurance regime applies to accounts, not to tokens.
Deposit insurance, as it is designed today, insures money in accounts. It would only insure
the amount of stablecoins in the holder’s account and not the amount of stablecoins that are
circulating outside of the account. To see this distinction more clearly, suppose your account
at the bank has $100 in it—$50 in private stablecoins and $50 in sovereign cash. You
See Jack Schickler, EU Commission Favors Ban on Large-Scale Stablecoins, Document Shows, COINDESK (May
11, 2022), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2022/05/11/eu-commission-favors-ban-on-large-scale-stablecoinsdocument-shows/.
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withdraw $10 in stablecoins and spend these coins buying groceries. Those $10 of stablecoins
are now circulating in the economy and are no longer connected to you or your account. The
current deposit insurance framework safeguards the $40 of stablecoins and $50 of cash
remaining in your account at the bank. But the $10 of circulating stablecoins are not covered.
In addition, consider the fact that the bank could theoretically give stablecoins to individual
and businesses that borrow from the bank. Those stablecoins are also not insured unless the
borrowers store those stablecoins in bank accounts. In all these scenarios, the stablecoins are
still liabilities of the bank. This means the bank is required to honor the redemption of those
coins if holders come back to the bank and demand cash in return.
In order for stablecoins to be fully insured, the deposit insurance framework would likely
have to change. Specifically, the coins themselves would have to be insured. Moreover, the
amount of insurance cannot be limited as it is now—set at $250,000 per account. A single
party could hold $1,000,000 of coins, but only $250,000 would be insured even if these coins
are not deposited in the bank. The amount of federal insurance would potentially be huge.
Therefore, it seems that government insurance for all coins would not be feasible.
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Conclusion
While the technology has changed tremendously, the underlying economic principles have
not. Credible sovereign money is information-insensitive, trades at par, and supports trillions
of economic transactions. Importantly, it is not subject to bank runs. Economic theory and
history teach us that the government can provide such information-insensitive money. The
question before us is whether the government should be the only entity to provide such money.
This is the matter of “coexistence.”
This matter is not an academic hypothetical. Stablecoins are gaining a greater foothold inside
and outside of the cryptocurrency ecosystem. For example, the recently launched USDF
Consortium (“USDF”) consists of a group of U.S. banks and FinTech firms that issue and use
stablecoins for payment transfers and other digital assets. USDF includes members like New
York Community Bank, FirstBank, Sterling National Bank, and Synovus Bank.118
At the same time, countries around the world are actively pushing ahead with the research
and development of CBDCs, the digital version of sovereign money. According to a survey of
central banks conducted by the Bank for International Settlements, 86 percent of central
banks are actively researching the potential for CBDCs, 60 percent were experimenting with
the technology, and 14 percent were deploying pilot projects. 119 Should private stablecoins,
even well-regulated ones, circulate alongside sovereign CBDCs in the coming decades?
We approach the coexistence debate by reviewing historical case studies through the lens of
economic theory. The only times when privately issued monies have circulated successfully
occurred (a) in limited geographical areas and (b) were backed by unlimited liability. In other
words, if Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, and Warren Buffet—with a
combined net worth of $762 billion 120 —decided to issue a private currency that (a) only
circulated in northern California and (b) were backed by unlimited liability against their
personal assets, that privately issued currency would probably succeed. Without those
conditions, however, economic theory and history demonstrate that only the government can
credibly establish money for mass circulation.
The reasons for the sovereign’s money monopoly are grounded firmly in preserving financial
stability, specifically in warding off banking panics caused by the proliferation of privately
issued money. But the reasons also extend to monetary and fiscal policy. Should the
government have greater control over the money supply, and thereby have a greater ability
to conduct monetary policy? Should the profits of issuing money accrue to the private sector
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or to the government? As discussed in Part III, these questions were debated over a century
ago, and the legal and financial architecture was changed to give a monopoly to the sovereign.
The economics have not changed.
These lessons, and the corresponding economics, appear have been forgotten in recent years.
In the United States, lawmakers across the political spectrum and financial regulators are
preparing for a world of private money circulating alongside sovereign money. Debates on
what is the best regulatory path forward take coexistence as a given: Should the SEC regulate
certain stablecoins as securities? Should the CFTC regulate stablecoins as commodities?
Under what circumstances will the OCC let banks operate in the stablecoins ecosystem?
These questions all assume coexistence.
It is imperative to take a step back and challenge the underlying assumption. We should be
careful to not relearn the lessons of the 19th and 20th centuries.
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